Quality of Name Resolution in the Domain Name System

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Abstract—The Domain Name System (DNS) is integral to today’s Internet. Name resolution for a domain is often dependent on servers well outside the control of the domain’s owner. In this paper we propose a formal model for analyzing the name dependencies inherent in DNS, based on protocol specification and actual implementations. We derive metrics to quantify the extent to which domain names affect other domain names. It is found that under certain conditions, the name resolution for over one-half of the queries exhibits influence of domains not expressly configured by administrators. This result serves to quantify the degree of vulnerability of DNS due to dependencies that administrators are unaware of. The model presented in the paper also shows that the set of domains whose resolution affects a given domain name is much smaller than previously thought. The model also shows that with caching of NS target addresses, the number of influential domains expands greatly, thereby making the DNS infrastructure more vulnerable.

I. INTRODUCTION

Nearly all of today’s Internet applications rely on the Domain Name System (DNS) for proper function. Its major role of name-to-address translation is especially key to users, who are largely accustomed to recognizing Internet “locations” by human-friendly words, titles, and abbreviations, rather than numeric IP address. DNS is also necessary for email delivery, service discovery, and host identification. Since DNS details are often left to the client resolver and abstracted at the application level, its integrity and security are critical. While temporary failures due to misconfiguration may cause inconvenience, targeted attack by malicious parties could be much less discernible, and the repercussions more severe. Malicious parties seek to taint DNS responses, redirecting applications to servers within their control, where sensitive information can be stolen.

While the concept of name resolution is relatively simple, the overall system is complex and its effects far-reaching. Name resolution for a domain is often dependent on servers well outside the control of the domain’s owner and managed by third parties. A network of inter-organizational relationships overlays the DNS infrastructure, and configurations that create a dependency on peer organizations are in turn affected by the security and accuracy of namespaces linked through this network. An understanding of a domain’s context in the entire system is integral for reliability, integrity, and security of DNS.

In this work we analyze the network of inter-organization dependencies comprising DNS. We derive a model to represent this network, based on DNS behavior in specification and implementation. Metrics are derived from the model to analyze the quality of name resolution for a domain name, based on the other names that affect its resolution. A large sample of recent DNS name dependency data was collected and analyzed based on these metrics. The results show how configurable caching behaviors of name servers affect the size of the namespace that influences a domain. The amount of influence coming from namespace not explicitly configured by DNS administrators is also analyzed.

The primary contributions presented in this research are:

- A formal model for analysis of DNS name dependencies, based on specification and actual implementations
- Metrics for quantifying the influence domain names have on other domain names

Previous work in this area is described in Section II. In Section III we introduce the concept of DNS name dependencies and review pertinent fundamentals of name resolution. In Section IV we formalize a graph model for analyzing DNS name dependencies and derive methods for quantifying influence. We describe methodologies employed for data collection, an evaluation of the graph model, and an analysis of the observed quality of name resolution in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.

II. PREVIOUS WORK

The concept of name dependencies was most recently analyzed by Ramasubramanian, et al. [1]. Their research identifies a set of name servers that affect the resolution of a given domain name and which collectively comprise its trusted computing base (TCB).

We build on the work presented in [1], performing further examination of several areas to create a model of name dependencies in DNS. The metric largely referred to in [1] is the number of distinct name servers in the TCB—identified both by IP address and name. In practice, redundant servers are typically deployed by an organization to provide diversity and high availability. In such cases, it is likely that versions and configurations are consistent across the servers maintained by a single organization. In this research we examine diversity of

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the namespace in the TCB, rather than the number of servers. We also consider the role of glue records and caching.

Pappas, et al. [2] surveyed the DNS infrastructure for configuration errors that negatively impact DNS robustness. The authors examined subtle misconfigurations that could bring about behaviors such as diminished server redundancy, lame delegation, and cyclic dependency. This research presents a model that may be used to methodically identify DNS configuration errors and security vulnerabilities.

Other behavioral studies for DNS robustness and security have been performed in [3], [4]. Design of next-generation DNS systems using peer-to-peer overlay networks have been suggested in [5]–[7] both for security and performance enhancement.

The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) are the industry-accepted standard for securing DNS [8]–[10]. It adds cryptographic signatures to DNS resources, so resolvers can verify the authenticity of the answers they receive. However, the effort required to deploy and maintain DNSSEC-signed zones has made its adoption slow. Our survey of the DNS namespace showed that only 0.02% of zones are currently signed. While DNSSEC preserves the integrity of DNS answers, it does not affect the relationships between the TCB shown in our model, particularly for metrics like performance and availability.

III. NAME DEPENDENCIES IN DNS

DNS is the system by which domain names are translated into addresses. The DNS namespace is organized hierarchically. Zones are pieces of the namespace managed by a single entity and are delegated to organizations from the top down, beginning with the root zone. In the resolution process name servers that are resolvers query authoritative name servers, which either provide an answer or a referral to a delegated zone. For example, in Figure 1, administration of the sports.net zone has been delegated by the net zone.

Resolution of a domain name is often dependent on resolution of other domain names. Three specific components in the DNS protocol lead to such name dependencies:

- **Parent zones**: Because name resolution is performed by traversing the name hierarchy from the top down, a name is always dependent on its parent zone.

- **NS targets**: The NS (name server) resource record (RR) type uses names, rather than addresses, for specifying servers authoritative for a zone, so a resolver must resolve the names before it can query the authoritative servers.

- **Aliases**: If a name resolves to an alias (i.e., CNAME RR type), then to obtain an address, the alias target must also be resolved.

Domain name \( u \) depends on domain name \( v \) if resolution of \( v \) may influence resolution of \( u \). Dependence is transitive: if \( u \) depends on \( v \) and \( v \) depends on \( w \), then \( u \) depends on \( w \). The term trusted computing base (TCB), as used in this work, refers to zones, which typically correspond to administering organizations or configurations.

The raw size of the TCB is not enough to measure the effects of third-party namespace on resolution of a domain name, as in [1]. In some cases policy or preference may dictate whether or not the existence of a zone is acceptable in the TCB (e.g., a government zone that prohibits zones operated by foreign governments in its TCB). However, a thorough analysis will show that not all names have equal influence. In this research we introduce level of influence \( I_u(v) \) as a quantitative measure of \( v \)’s influence on \( u \). Level of influence is formally defined in Section IV.

Influence is categorized into two classes: active and passive. If domain name \( u \) is actively influenced by domain name \( v \), then with some non-zero probability resolution of \( v \) will be required for resolution of name \( u \). If domain name \( u \) is passively influenced by domain name \( v \), then although \( v \) may not be required for resolution of \( u \), resolution of \( v \) may affect resolution of \( u \) with some probability. The conditions for active and passive influence are described later in this section.

Some discussion of specific aspects of DNS behavior is required to properly create a well-formed dependency model. The role of glue and additional records in delegation, the selection of authoritative name servers, and the trust ranking of data are discussed in the remainder of this section. Table I is provided as a reference for this discussion. It contains the data for several fictitious zones, shown hierarchically in Fig. 1. The behaviors of two popular DNS server implementations are also referenced: the Berkeley Internet Name Daemon version 9.5 (BIND) [11] and djbdns [12].

A. Glue and additional records

When a query for a name in zone \( z \) reaches name server \( s \), which is authoritative for \( \text{Parent}(z) \), \( s \) returns the set of NS RRs corresponding to the name servers authoritative for \( z \), as a “referral”. The set of NS target names for this set is denoted \( \text{NS}_z \). Addresses of the NS targets in \( \text{NS}_z \) are required for the resolver to subsequently query the servers. If any NS targets are subdomains of \( z \), then \( s \) must also include glue records for those targets in the response’s additional section to “bootstrap” the resolution process, so there isn’t a cyclic dependency between a zone and its descendants [13]. The glue records are A (address) RRs corresponding to the target names of the NS RRs for \( z \) but maintained in the \( \text{Parent}(z) \) zone. The NS RRs and associated glue records for tennis.com are found on lines 7–11 of the com zone in Table I.

If server \( s \) has pertinent non-glue A RRs available locally, it may send them in the additional section of its response to expedite the resolution process for the resolver.
happen if $s$ is also authoritative for the zones to which the targets belong or if $s$ has an answer cached from an authoritative response [13]. However, any such RRs included in the response for which $Parent(z)$ is not a superdomain are considered out-of-bailiwick (i.e., outside its jurisdiction). Thus resolver implementations should independently obtain an authoritative answer for the out-of-bailiwick target names before querying such servers.

The resolver is responsible for resolving any names from $NS_z$ which are out-of-bailiwick or not included in the additional section of a response from $s$. Such induced queries indicate active influence of the resolved names on $z$, since it is directly dependent on their resolution.

B. Name server selection

RFC 1035 [14] describes the process by which servers are selected by a resolver for querying a zone $z$ as part of the resolution process. The resolver begins with the list of all server names $NS_z$. The addresses known by the resolver for target names in $NS_z$ initially populate the set of corresponding addresses, and it initiates requests in parallel to acquire addresses for any others. The resolver also associates historical statistics, such as response time and success rate, to each address. The complete set of addresses corresponding to NS target names in $NS_z$ is denoted $NSA_z$. A resolver will avoid using an address from $NSA_z$ twice until all addresses have been tried at least once. After that, it prefers the server with the best performance record, thus fine-tuning the performance for lookups of $z$ [14].

This behavior is not consistent across implementations. The djbdns name server selects a server from $NSA_z$ uniformly at random. However, a resolver using BIND, which follows the performance-based selection guideline, will gravitate toward preferring a single server or set of servers in $NSA_z$. We make the assumption that requests for subdomains of $z$ arrive from resolvers in diverse network and geographic locations, such that the preference to servers in $NSA_z$ is distributed uniformly among such resolvers. This leads to an equal probability that any server in $NSA_z$ receives a query for subdomains of $z$.

C. Trust ranking

RFC 2181 [15] outlines a relative ranking of trustworthiness of data for name servers to consider as part of operation. Among the total ranking are the following (in decreasing order of trustworthiness):

- Data from a zone for which the server is authoritative, other than glue data
- The authoritative data included in the answer section of an authoritative reply
- The data in the authority section of an authoritative reply
- Glue from a zone for which the server is authoritative
- Data from additional section of a response

This trust ranking has effects on name dependencies with regard to both the resolver and the authoritative server. The authoritative set of NS target names for $z$, $NS_z$, may differ from those stored in $Parent(z)$, $NS'_z$. While a resolver must initially use the set $NS'_z$ provided by a server authoritative for $Parent(z)$, once it receives an answer for a name in $z$ from a server authoritative for $z$, it will use the target names in $NS_z$ (provided in the authority section) in preference to those in $NS'_z$. This behavior is consistent with both BIND and djbdns. Server selection therefore depends not only on the NS targets in $NS_z$ but also on the probability that the set of NS RRs for $z$ has been cached by the resolver—either from the answer or authority section of an authoritative reply. This probability is denoted $P_{NS}(z)$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I</th>
<th>The zone data from several fictitious zones, whose hierarchy is shown in Fig. 1. Any coincidence with actual zones of the same name is unintentional.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SORIGIN soccer.com.</td>
<td><strong>Name</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
soccer.com. | NS | ns1.sports.net. |
bball.soccer.com. | A | 10.0.1.1 |

| SORIGIN tennis.com. | **Name** | **Type** | **Value** |
tennis.com. | NS | ns1.sports.net. |
ns1.tennis.com. | A | 10.0.2.1 |
www.tennis.com. | A | 10.0.2.2 |
racket | A | 10.0.2.3 |

| SORIGIN athletics.com. | **Name** | **Type** | **Value** |
ns1.atletics.com. | A | 10.0.6.1 |

| SORIGIN com. | **Name** | **Type** | **Value** |
com. | NS | ns1.com. |
ns1.com. | A | 10.0.3.1 |
soccer.com. | NS | ns1.sports.net. |
tennis.com. | NS | ns1.sports.net. |
ball.soccer.com. | A | 10.0.1.1 |
nsl.tennis.com. | A | 10.0.2.1 |
ns1.atletics.com. | A | 10.0.6.1 |

| SORIGIN sports.net. | **Name** | **Type** | **Value** |
sports.net. | NS | ns1.sports.net. |
sports.net. | NS | ns1.atletics.com. |
ns1.sports.net. | A | 10.0.4.1 |

| SORIGIN net. | **Name** | **Type** | **Value** |
net. | NS | ns1.net. |
nsl.net. | A | 10.0.5.1 |
sports.net. | NS | ns1.sports.net. |
sports.net. | NS | ns1.atletics.com. |
ns1.sports.net. | A | 10.0.4.1 |
If authoritative server \( s \in NSA_{\text{Parent}(z)} \) has caching functionality enabled and has stored the A RR for an NS target \( v \in NS_z \) from the answer section of an authoritative response, according to the RFC, it will trust this RR more than a glue in its own configuration. \( P_s(v) \) denotes the probability that \( s \) has in cache and provides such authoritative data for \( v \). This behavior is configurable in BIND, but it is enabled by default.

If resolver \( c \) has cached the address for \( v \in NS_z \), as the result of an answer from an authoritative source from a prior transaction, then \( c \) deems the cached data more trustworthy than any data received in the additional section of a response. Thus, it will use the previously cached data in preference to data—whether from glue or \( s ’ s \) cache—returned in the additional section by \( s \in NSA_{\text{Parent}(z)} \). \( P_c(v) \) denotes the probability that \( c \) has and uses such authoritative data for \( v \) in its cache. BIND adheres strictly to this, as it will direct queries to an address received by a more “trustworthy” source over a server returned in an additional section—unless the authoritative data is an alias (i.e., a CNAME RR). The djbdns name server treats the A RRs with equal precedence, but will always use an authoritative CNAME RR over an additional A RR of the same name.

Suppose \( v \in NS_z \) is a subdomain of \( \text{Parent}(z) \), \( \text{Parent}(v) \neq z \), and \( \text{Parent}(z) \) is properly configured with a glue record for \( v \). If an authoritative answer for \( v \) has previously been resolved and cached by either \( s \in NSA_{\text{Parent}(z)} \) or resolver \( c \), then \( z \) is affected by \( v \) and its name dependencies. This behavior describes passive influence of \( v \) on \( z \). The probability of passive influence, \( P_{(s,c)}(v) \), is the combined probability of \( P_s(v) \) and \( P_c(v) \), the likelihood that either \( s \) or \( c \) has and uses a cached authoritative answer for \( v \). Since the probabilities are independent of one another, \( P_{(s,c)}(v) \) is calculated:

\[
P_{(s,c)}(v) = P_s(v) \lor P_c(v) = 1 - (1 - P_s(v))(1 - P_c(v))
\]

IV. DNS DEPENDENCY MODEL

Name dependencies are quantified using level of influence, which is the probability that one name will be utilized for resolving another. Let \( I_u(v) \in [0, 1] \) denote \( u \)'s level of influence on \( v \)—i.e., the probability that domain \( v \) will be used in the resolution process for \( u \). Dependencies may be reciprocated (i.e., \( I_u(v) > 0 \) and \( I_v(u) > 0 \)), though the level of influence in each direction may differ. The level of influence of a domain does not necessarily indicate the trustworthiness of that domain. It will be shown that dependencies of a domain propagate along dependency paths to domains outside of its control. In the remainder of this section, a model is defined for analysis and quantification of DNS name dependencies.

A. Name dependency graph

To derive the values for influence of domain name \( d \) a directed, connected graph, \( G_d = (V_d, A_d) \), is used to model name dependencies. The graph \( G_d \) contains a single sink, \( r \), which is the root zone. Each node in the graph \( v \in V_d \) represents a domain name, and each edge, \( (u, v) \in A_d \), signifies that \( u \) is directly dependent on \( v \) for proper resolution of itself and any descendant names. Each edge, \( (u, v) \in A_d \), carries a weight, \( w(u, v) \), indicative of the probability that it will be followed for resolving \( u \). A name dependency graph for domain name \( www.soccer.com \) is shown in Fig. 2, built from the data in Table I.

Edges are placed on the graph from each domain name \( u, u \neq r \) to its parent \( \text{Parent}(u) \) with \( w(u, \text{Parent}(u)) = 1 \); a domain name is always dependent on its parent. If resolution of domain name \( u \) yields a CNAME RR, then an
edge is placed between $u$ and its target name, $\text{Cname}(u)$, with $w(u, \text{Cname}(u)) = 1$; the resolution of an alias is always dependent on the resolution of its target. Such edges in Fig. 2 are those between www.soccer.com and its parent, soccer.com, and between www.soccer.com and its canonical name, www.tennis.com.

Placement of edges and weights corresponding to NS target dependencies is somewhat involved and draws from the discussion in Section III. The considerations are summarized in Table III.

We first identify the proportion of queries distributed among each of the NS target names in $\mathcal{NS}_z$, which we use as a base for calculating the weights of edges in $A_d$ stemming from NS target dependencies. Since resolvers select from addresses rather than names of authoritative servers, the probability, $P_q(z, v)$, of querying any NS target $v \in \mathcal{NS}_z$ for resolution of $z$ will be some fraction of $\mathcal{NS}_z$ that reflects the proportion of server addresses attributed to $v$. Let $S_v$ represent the set of addresses to which $v \in \mathcal{NS}_z$ resolves. A naïve formula for determining query probability $P_q(z, v)$ is to simply calculate the fraction of total server addresses authoritative for $z$ that correspond to $v$:

$$P_q(z, v) = \frac{|S_v|}{|\mathcal{NS}_z|}$$

The zone data for foo.com in Table IV shows that an NS target name that resolves to multiple addresses, such as ns1.foo.com, has a higher probability of being queried for names in the zone than an NS target name that resolves to only a single address, such as ns2.foo.com.

It is possible that multiple NS target names in $\mathcal{NS}_z$ resolve to the same address, so a single address in $S_v$ may also be attributed to other names in $\mathcal{NS}_z$. A more complete approach to determining query probability therefore is to evenly divide the probabilistic weight attributed to a server address among all the names that resolve to that address:

$$P_q(z, v) = \frac{\sum_{s \in S_v} |\{u \in \mathcal{NS}_z | s \in S_u\}|^{-1}}{|\mathcal{NS}_z|}$$

For example, in Table IV both ns1.bar.com and ns2.bar.com resolve to 10.20.0.1, so the weight of that server is split evenly among both names. The result is that ns1.bar.com queried with with 0.75 probability for bar.com because it also resolves to 10.20.0.2, and ns2.bar.com is queried with only 0.25 probability.

When $\mathcal{NS}_z \neq \mathcal{NS}_z'$, the query probability of an edge to NS target $v$ must also factor in to the probability, $P_{NS}(z)$, that the NS RRset for $z$ is cached from an authoritative source, as well as $v$’s membership in $\mathcal{NS}_z$ and $\mathcal{NS}_z'$:

$$P_q(z, v) = P_{NS}(z)P(v \in \mathcal{NS}_z)\frac{\sum_{s \in S_v} |\{u \in \mathcal{NS}_z | s \in S_u\}|^{-1}}{|\mathcal{NS}_z|}^{-1} + (1 - P_{NS}(z))P(v \in \mathcal{NS}_z')\frac{\sum_{s \in S_v} |\{u \in \mathcal{NS}_z' | s \in S_u\}|^{-1}}{|\mathcal{NS}_z'|^{-1}}$$

For simplicity we assume that $\mathcal{NS}_z = \mathcal{NS}_z'$ unless specified otherwise.

If NS target $v \in \mathcal{NS}_z$ is not a subdomain of Parent($z$), edge $(z, v)$ is added to $G_d$ with $w(z, v) = P_q(z, v)$. Resolution of $v$ is required for (i.e., actively influences) resolution of $z$. An example is soccer.com’s dependency on nsl.sports.net.

If target name $v \in \mathcal{NS}_z$ is a subdomain of $z$, the Parent($z$) zone should include a glue record for $v$. If no glue record exists for $v$ in the Parent($z$) zone, then resolution of $v$ is required for (i.e., actively influences) resolution of $z$, and an edge $(z, v)$ is added to $G_d$ with $w(z, v) = P_q(z, v)$. Such is the case with soccer.com’s dependency on racket.tennis.com.

If a glue record for $v$ exists in bailiwick, then resolution of $v$ is not required for resolving $z$ because the resolver will use the address provided in glue from the Parent($z$) authoritative server. When Parent($v$) = $z$, there is no edge $(z, v)$ in $G_d$; all servers authoritative for $z$ have the authoritative data for $v$, such as with ball.soccer.com’s relationship to soccer.com. However, when Parent($v$) $\neq z$ an edge $(z, v)$ is added with $w(z, v) = P_{NS}(v)P_q(z, v)$; the name $v$ passively influences $z$, dependent on the probability that either the resolver or the authoritative server has the address for $v$ cached from an authoritative source. An example is tennis.com’s dependency on ball.soccer.com.

The active influence dependency graph, $G_d'$, of domain name $d$ is the subgraph of $G_d$ produced when $P_{NS}(v) = 0, \forall v \in V_d$ and nodes with only zero-weight in-edges are removed from the graph. The active influence dependency graph for www.soccer.com would be created by eliminating the ball.soccer.com node in Fig. 2.

B. Level of influence

An analysis of the dependency paths in $G_d$ is necessary to determine the level of influence of the domain names $v \in V_d$ on $d$. The dependency paths in $G_d$ are modeled by performing a depth-first traversal of $G_d$, beginning with $d$. This depth-first traversal produces the exhaustive set of acyclic intermediate paths of name dependencies for resolving $d$. The level of influence is calculated by determining the probability that paths leading from $d$ will reach $v$ during resolution:

$$I_d(v) = P(d, \ldots, v)$$

To calculate $P(d, \ldots, v)$, the probabilities of encountering $v$ in the dependency paths beginning with each of $u$’s direct

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>$w(z, v)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>foo.com.</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>ns1.foo.com.</td>
<td>$\frac{7}{3} = 0.67$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foo.com.</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>ns2.foo.com.</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{3} = 0.33$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ns1.foo.com.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10.20.0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ns1.foo.com.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10.20.0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ns2.foo.com.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10.20.0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bar.com.</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>ns1.bar.com.</td>
<td>$\frac{7}{2} = 0.75$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bar.com.</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>ns2.bar.com.</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{2} = 0.25$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nsl.bar.com.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10.20.0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nsl.bar.com.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10.20.0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nsl2.bar.com.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10.20.0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE IV**

Example zone data to illustrate query distribution among NS target names of servers authoritative for a zone.
dependencies must first be recursively calculated and aggregated. The probability of encountering \( v \) in a path beginning with edge \((u, j) \in A_d\) is determined by multiplying the probability, \( w(u, j) \), of following edge \((u, j)\) by the probability of encountering \( v \) in a path beginning with \( j\):

\[
P(u, j, \ldots, v) = \begin{cases} 
  w(u, j) & \text{if } j = v \text{ (direct dep)} \\
  0 & \text{if } j = r \text{ (root)} \\
  w(u, j)P(j, \ldots, v) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

For a given domain name \( u \in V_d \), resolution of \( u \) often requires following multiple branches at an intermediate node, depending on the relationship between the dependency types. For NS target dependencies of \( u \) at most one address from \( NSA_u \) is followed (assuming no server failure). However, alias and parent dependencies exist independently of the NS target dependencies. For example, when resolving names in \( tennis.com \) using the zone data from Table I, either \( ns1.tennis.com \), \( ball.soccer.com \), or \( ns1.sports.net \) will be selected, each with equal probability. However, its resolution remains entirely dependent on its parent, \( com \), regardless of which server in \( NSA_{tennis.com} \) is selected for query.

Aggregating the probability of encountering \( v \) in paths beginning with each of \( u \)'s direct dependencies is as follows. First the probability of encountering \( v \) through any NS-type dependencies is determined by calculating the sum of encountering it in each of the NS-type dependency edges because the probabilities are dependent on one another:

\[
P(u, [NS \text{ dep}], \ldots, v) = \sum_{j \in NSA_u} w(u, j)P(j, \ldots, v)
\]

This probability is then combined independently with the probability of encountering \( v \) in paths beginning with any alias- or parent-type dependencies:

\[
P(u, \ldots, v) = 1 - \left( 1 - P(u, Parent(u), \ldots, v) \right) \left( 1 - P(u, Cname(u), \ldots, v) \right) \left( 1 - P(u, [NS \text{ dep}], \ldots, v) \right)
\]

Using these expressions, we calculate the level to which \( sports.net \) influences \( soccer.com \):

\[
l_{www.soccer.com(sports.net)} = 1 - \left( 1 - P(www.soccer.com, soccer.com, \ldots, sports.net) \right) \\
\ldots = 0.62 + 0.06P_{\{s,c\}}(ball.soccer.com)
\]

**Algorithm 1 NonTrivialZones\( (d) \)**

**Input:** Domain name \( d \)

**Output:** Set of non-trivial zones in \( V_d \)

1. \( D \leftarrow \{ Parent(d) \} \)
2. for all \((u, v) \in A_d \) do
3. if \((u, v)\) is an NS target or alias dependency then
4. \( D \leftarrow D \cup \{ Parent(v) \} \)
5. end if
6. end for
7. return \( D \)

**C. Graph properties**

Finding the level of influence of a single name on \( d \) requires following all paths between \( d \) and \( r \), which is computationally complex. However, often it may suffice to simply know the set of names influencing \( d \), or other representative properties of \( G_d \). This section describes some properties from which metrics can be derived for quantifying the TCB of \( d \) and measuring the extent to which its resolution is affected by third parties.

1) **Influential zones:** The set of influential zones \( Z_d \subseteq V_d \) is a measure of the TCB of \( d \). Although a single organization may maintain several zones in \( Z_d \), it is generally representative of the diversity of organizations that influence resolution of \( d \). In Fig. 2 \( Z_{www.soccer.com} = \{ soccer.com, tennis.com, sports.net, athletics.com, com, net, \} \).

2) **Non-trivial zones:** Non-trivial zones are the result of explicitly configured inter-zone dependencies. Included in this set are the parent zones of any NS or alias targets in \( A_d \). A non-trivial zone \( foo.bar.com \) that influences \( d \) may contribute up to four zones to \( Z_d \). However, if no in-edges resulting from alias- or NS-type dependencies exist for any of its ancestor zones (\( bar.com, com, \) and \\( "." \)), then they exist in \( Z_d \) only because \( foo.bar.com \) is explicitly configured as a dependent zone and are thus trivial. Algorithm 1 identifies non-trivial zones by iterating the set of edges \( A_d \) and adding the parent zones of NS and alias targets. In Fig. 2 \( U_{www.soccer.com} = \{ soccer.com, tennis.com, sports.net, athletics.com \} \).

3) **First-order dependencies:** A subset of non-trivial zones \( U_d' \subseteq U_d \) are explicitly configured by \( d \) (or \( Parent(d) \), if \( d \) is not a zone) and comprise first-order dependencies. \( U_d' \) also includes the non-trivial zones in the ancestry of each explicitly configured zone. Algorithm 2 finds all the alias (lines 5–7) and NS target (line 11) dependencies for a name \( d \) and then includes the parent zone for each target (line 15) and each non-trivial zone in its ancestry (lines 16–21). In Fig. 2
Algorithm 2 FirstOrderDeps(d)

Input: Domain name d
Output: Set of first-order dependencies in V_d
1: N ← NonTrivialZones(d)
2: /* M is the set of explicitly configured names for d */
3: M ← {d}
4: if d is not a zone then
5: if d is an alias then
6: M ← M ∪ {Cname(d)}
7: end if
8: d ← Parent(d)
9: end if
10: /* Add NS target edges for zone d to M */
11: M ← M ∪ {u ∈ V_d | ∃(d, u) ∈ A_d, NS target dep.}
12: D ← {d}
13: /* Add non-trivial zones in M’s ancestry to D */
14: for all u ∈ M do
15: v ← Parent(u)
16: while v ≠ r do
17: if v ∈ N then
18: D ← D ∪ {v}
19: end if
20: v ← Parent(v)
21: end while
22: end for
23: return D

U_www.soccer.com = {soccer.com, tennis.com, sports.net}.

Algorithm 3 ControlledAlias(u, D)

Input: Domain name u
Input: Set of first-order dependencies D
Output: False if u directly or indirectly aliases a name outside explicit dependency; True otherwise
1: H ← {u}
2: while u is an alias do
3: if Parent(Cname(u)) ∉ D then
4: return False
5: else if Cname(u) ∈ H then /* Loop detected */
6: return True
7: end if
8: H ← H ∪ {u}
9: u ← Cname(u)
10: end while
11: return True

Algorithm 4 ThirdPartyInfluence1(u, D)

Input: Domain name u
Input: Set of first-order dependencies D
Output: Influence on u by names outside of D
1: if u is not a zone then
2: /* u aliases a name outside of D */
3: if ControlledAlias(u, D) = False then
4: return 1.0
5: end if
6: u ← Parent(u)
7: end if
8: P ← 0
9: /* Aggregate influence outside D for u’s ancestors */
10: while u ≠ r do
11: P_u ← 0
12: for all v ∈ V_d | ∃(u, v) ∈ A_d, NS target dep. do
13: if Parent(v) ∉ D or ControlledAlias(v, D) = False then
14: P_u ← P_u + w(u, v)
15: end if
16: end for
17: P ← 1 − (1 − P)(1 − P_u)
18: u ← Parent(u)
19: end while
20: return P

We analyze several different areas to assess quality of name resolution.

A. Data collection

We populated a database of name dependencies by crawling the namespace of known domain names. A set of over 3,000,000 hostnames was extracted from URLs indexed as part of the Open Directory Project (ODP) at DMOZ [16] dated April, 2009. These names were combined with over 100,000 names received as queries by the recursive servers at the International Conference for High-performance Computing, Net-
we found the set of servers only authoritative for parent and child zones by using some extra probing. For zone targets returned were recorded and subsequently surveyed for any matching NS, MX (mail exchange) and CNAME RRs. queries to a recursive server to receive an authoritative answer with the root. Surveying a domain name consisted of issuing its ancestry which had not already been surveyed, beginning working, Storage and Analysis (SC08) [17]. The ODP/SC08 names were used to seed the domain name database. Each name was investigated by first surveying each name in its ancestry which had not already been surveyed, beginning with the root. Surveying a domain name consisted of issuing queries to a recursive server to receive an authoritative answer for any matching NS, MX (mail exchange) and CNAME RRs. The relationships between the name and any corresponding targets returned were recorded and subsequently surveyed.

For each NS RR, we checked the consistency between parent and child zones by using some extra probing. For zone we found the set of servers only authoritative for Parent(z), NSA\textsuperscript{Parent(z)} = NSA\textsubscript{Parent(z)} - NSA\textsubscript{z}. For each server in NSA\textsubscript{Parent(z)} we issued an NS query for z, until a response was received that did not have the authoritative answer (AA) flag set. Only if the AA flag was not set could we accurately obtain the set of NS RRs (NS\textsuperscript{z}) maintained by Parent(z). If NS\textsubscript{z} \neq NS\textsuperscript{z}, an inconsistency is detected.

The time-to-live (TTL) field of additional address records corresponding to targets of NS RRs in the authority section of server responses are used to identify the presence of glue records in the parent zone. When server s returns a non-authoritative response, a second query is issued to s after a two-second delay (both without the recursion-desired flag set). Since TTL is measured in seconds, the two-second delay between queries will result in a decreasing TTL for additional records sent from s’s cache. If for an NS target there is no corresponding address record in the additional section, then it is indicative that the parent has not been configured with a glue record. If the TTL of the additional record differs between the two responses, then it is inferred that the record came from an authoritative response in s’s cache. Since such a response would take precedence over any glue record configured in Parent(d), we optimistically give the zone the benefit of the doubt that it is configured with a glue record, if the NS target is in-bailiwick.

If the TTL value of an additional record does not vary between the two responses from s, it could indicate one of several things:

- Parent(z) is configured with a glue record for the additional record;
- s is (also) authoritative for the zone to which the additional record belongs; or
- s is authoritative for an ancestor of the NS target and has been configured with a glue record for that NS target.

We assume optimistically in this case that if the NS target is in-bailiwick Parent(z) is configured with a glue record.

If no non-authoritative answers are returned from querying the servers in NSA\textsuperscript{Parent(z)} \setminus \text{FirstOrderDeps}(z), then we cannot determine inconsistencies between NS\textsuperscript{z} and NS\textsubscript{z}, and their corresponding glue records. However, in practice, if NSA\textsubscript{Parent(z)} \subseteq NSA\textsubscript{z}, then consistency is satisfied implicitly since all servers in NSA\textsubscript{Parent(z)} will send authoritative records from z over corresponding records from Parent(z) [15]. For all zones in our analysis we let PNS(z) = 0.5, so that NS target names in both NS\textsubscript{z} and NS\textsuperscript{z} were considered for server selection.

Our analysis did not follow dependencies of general top-level domains (gTLDs), such as com and edu. There were two reasons for this: all descendants of gTLDs share the same top-level ancestry and was therefore uninteresting from the top level up; and the names of many of the gTLD servers are in the gldt-servers.net zone, so as we increased the probability (P_{\text{gl}}(v)) that NS target names—including the names of the gTLD servers—were cached as part of our analysis, the third-party influence of names having non-net gTLDs approached 1, which skewed the results. Our analysis did, however, follow country-code top-level domains (e.g., us, fr). The results from the survey are summarized in Table V.

### B. Model validation

To validate the name dependency model presented in Section IV a random sample of over 600 of the ODP hostnames was selected, and a corresponding active dependency graph,
was calculated with $P_{NS}(z) = 0$.

We deployed BIND [11] as a resolver on more than 100 PlanetLab nodes [18], attempting to create an environment diverse enough that queries for each name by the collective resolvers would be uniformly distributed amongst authoritative servers. On each PlanetLab node a query was issued to the name daemon 100 times for each name, $d$. Before the initial query of each name, the server’s cache was flushed, so the source of every name resolved during the process could be identified, rather than relying on existing cached data from unknown sources. All DNS traffic to and from the server was monitored. Any address queries issued by the server were induced because of active influence on $d$. For every answer received for a name $u$ during the resolution of $d$, $u$ was mapped to the name of the server from which the answer was received. When the final response was received, containing the address corresponding to $d$, the names formed a graph of dependency paths from $d$ to $r$ representing the path(s) followed to resolve $d$, a subgraph of $G_d'$.

After each iteration, the addresses for any names resolved by induced queries were flushed from the server’s cache and explicitly re-queried, before beginning the next iteration. This is equivalent to speeding up the expiration of the cached names. Without this action, the server would always respond with the cached name from the previously acquired source, and the likelihood of exploring other potential paths to the root would be diminished. After the 100 iterations of querying $d$, the influence of each other name, $u$, on $d$ is determined by calculating the fraction of the iterations in which $u$ was included in the experimental graph.

We compared the observed dependency graph with the theoretical active dependency graph for each sample ODP name. For each name analyzed we verified that the influential names was a subset of those in $V_d$. The probability density function (PDF) of the difference in influence of each is shown in Fig. 3. The large peak in the graph demonstrates that 55% of the observed influence was exactly in line with the influence predicted by the model.

### C. Trusted computing base

The raw size of the TCB for hostnames collected in terms of influential zones and non-trivial zones is shown in Fig. 4 as a cumulative density function (CDF), and the statistics are shown in Table VI. Nearly all hostnames have a TCB smaller than 20 zones when $P_{(s,c)}(v) = 0$, and the average size of the TCB was 2.26 non-trivial zones and 5.26 total zones—both of which are reasonably small. When $P_{(s,c)}(v) > 0$, the average size of the TCB increases several times to 11.65 non-trivial and 16.53 total zones. Only about 80% have fewer than 20 zones; most of the remaining 20% have between 30 and 90 non-trivial and total zones in their TCB. Caching and using NS target names from authoritative sources, rather than glue, can increase the size of the TCB of a domain by several times.

### D. Controlled influence

The first-order ratio $\mu_{(v)}$, shown in Fig. 5, is used to determine the percentage of non-trivial zones that are expressly configured by the administrators of $d$. Values closer to 1 indicate that the administrators are largely in control of the zones comprising the TCB. The average first-order ratio was 0.92 for $P_{(s,c)}(v) = 0$ and 0.63 for $P_{(s,c)}(v) > 0$, indicating

![Fig. 3. The distribution of differences between the theoretical and empirical level of influence for each sample ODP name. Positive values indicate that the model predicted more influence than was observed.](image)

![Fig. 4. The CDF for the size of the TCB of ODP/SC08 hostnames. In](image)
that control of the TCB is lost as caching of NS target names is introduced. When $P_{\{S,C\}}(v) > 0$, third-party zones comprise more than half of the the non-trivial zones in the TCB of roughly 40% of the hostnames surveyed.

Fig. 6 shows the third-party influence of the ODP/SC08 hostnames. When $P_{\{S,C\}}(v) = 0$, 85% of the hostnames are not influenced at all by third parties. At $P_{\{S,C\}}(v) = 0.5$ only 60% of the hostnames are influenced less than 50% by third parties. When $P_{\{S,C\}}(v) = 1$ nearly half of the hostnames are influenced almost certainly by third parties. Again the behavior of caching preference of NS target names from authoritative sources at the resolver and authoritative servers greatly affects third-party influence of domain names.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper we have presented a graph model for analysis of name dependencies in DNS, which was based on specification and behavior of deployed DNS servers. We defined the trusted computing base (TCB) of a domain name in terms of namespace, and particularly zones. Methodology for calculating the level at which domain names influence the resolution of others was described and used to determine third-party influence—the probability that resolution of a domain name will utilize namespace outside the explicit configuration of domain administrators.

We observed that the TCB of domain names, measured by influential zones, is much smaller than previously thought. On average 92% of the non-trivial zones in the TCB of a domain name were explicitly configured by the domain administrators. However, caching of NS targets at the resolver and authoritative server can increase the size of the TCB and the influence of third-party namespace significantly, and should be considered when configuring DNS servers.

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